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Abstract  
From a political science perspective, my paper, as a summary of the stand of my PhD 
project, focuses on the impact of the institutional design on the negotiation of the 
financial framework 2007-2013. Using a neo-institutional approach, I concentrate on the 
analysis of actor’s behaviour during the negotiation process, with special emphasis on 
the behaviour of new member states, as new actors in this process. My hypotheses is: 
Although the general view is that it is the member states’ national interests that define 
their behaviour in financial negotiations, I argue that we can also detect several 
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 I Introduction  
"The distinction between new and old member states no longer 
makes sense. For me, this enlargement feels like a real reunion 
of members of the same family who had been broken up 
against their will and who, after many years of separation, are 
getting together again to live and work side-by-side and put 
their divisions behind them. "
1
Commission president, José Manuel Barroso 
 
The negotiation of the new financial framework was, after the enlargement and 
negotiations of the Constitution, an important subject on the Union’s agenda during 
2005 and the final agreement will radically affect the future of European integration. 
The EU needed a success to spread the sense of crisis created by the NO vote in the 
French and Dutch referenda on the EU constitution, and the bitter disputes over the 
budget that characterised the EU summit in June 2005. The agreement on the financial 
perspectives 2007-2013, signed in the early hours of 17 December and the result of two 
days of intense bargaining, was seen as vital to avoid a deepening of the European 
Union's crisis. But why does the negotiation of the financial perspectives have so 
fundamental importance? To answer this we need to look beyond the numbers of the 
EU budget and focus on the benefits which it brings. The budget supports the 
transformation of countries, turning secondary roads into highways. It helps European 
researchers to develop cleaner and securer energy. It underpins integration within local 
communities and it enables the management of the countryside. 
The negotiation on the financing of the EU was furthermore significant because it was 
the first time that a financial package was agreed in negotiation by an EU of 25 member 
states and it showed that the enlarged Union is capable to reach agreements.  
But the budget dispute is not still over. Since the financial perspectives are embedded in 
an interinstitutional agreement, the European parliament still has to give its approval 
and could use its veto power to demand a more "ambitious" settlement and to increase 
its influence in the budgetary process.
2
In my paper I will answer the questions, did institutions at the European level, seen as 
endogenous variables, shape the behaviour of new member states in recent negotiations 
                                                 
1 José Manuel Barroso, Statement to mark the first anniversary of enlargement, 01.05.2005. 
2 The European Parliament wants to increase funding for various programmes (life-long learning, 
Erasmus, Leonardo, foreign policy and consumer policy), greater budget flexibility, a well-defined role in 
the review process for the EU budget (both spending and income) and a pledge from Member States to 
certify EU funds have been properly managed. 
  1on the financial perspectives 2007-2013 and in case of an affirmative answer which 
ones could be detected and how did they influence actor behaviour?  
I will provide the answers in order to prove if new member behaviour was determined 
by different institutional variables from old member states. My hypotheses is: Although 
the general view is that it is the member states’ national interests that define their 
behaviour in financial negotiations, I argue that we can also detect several institutional 
variables at the European level which determined actor’s behaviour during the 
negotiation. 
Although, new member states (NMS) are not seen as a unique bloc with the same 
characteristics and interests and one cannot represent all of them, I will concentrate my 
analysis on the behaviour of Poland and especially the alliances maintained by this 
country during the negotiation process. Poland is by far the largest of them, making 
Warsaw a vital ally for other states.  
Financial negotiations are hard to understand and informed reporting is rare since the 
matters under discussion and the rules are complex and national governments can elude 
control relatively easily especially since the agreement on financial perspectives 2007-
2013 is recent, so my paper is based on the analysis of primary resources like official 
publications and secondary resources like newspaper reports. During 2006, I will 
conduct several interviews in order to verify my research. 
After an introductory delimitation of the theoretical framework I will concentrate on the 
variables which could explain actor’s behaviour and in the third chapter I will focus on 
the empirical analysis of recent financial negotiation with especial attention on the 
behaviour of Poland.   
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The analysis of European integration was long time dominated by a dichotomous debate 
between neo-functionalism, which has seen the EU-institutions as the Commission in 
the driving seat of the integration process through the exploitation of their roles in daily 
Community decision making (Beach 2005), and realism/liberal intergovernmentalism, 
emphasizing the central role of governments which derives from their veto power. 
(Moravcsik, 1993; 1995) 
This dichotomous debate received during the nineties various critics, concentrating on 
the question: Is the search for one theory explaining European integration wise at all? 
Pierson underlined that the investigation of particular policy areas through ‘grand’ 
European integration theories neglect the density and pluralism of actual policy-making 
within the EU. (Pierson, 1996: 125) This point, the insufficient explanation power, of 
wide ranging theories led scholars during the nineties develop other mid term theories, 
like multi-level governance (Jachtenfuchs; Kohler-Koch, 1996) and the policy networks 
approach (Héritier, 1994; Peterson, 1995b). 
After the differentiation in the nineties we could observe a concentration in European 
integration theory around the institutionalist approach, as Aspinwall and Schneider bear 
out “… the most important sign of theoretical convergence is, of course, that almost any 
Europeanist with minimal level of self-respect flags herself as an institutionalist at the 
moment” (Aspinwall; Schneider, 2000: 2). The focus on institutions as a foundation 
concept in political science, has given rise to a variety of institutionalist approaches and 
there is a wide divergence between new institutionalists but they share as a common 
assumption the idea that the existence of an institutional framework provides a source 
for a complementary or alternative logic of behaviour for agents. In this sense the most 
significant neoinstitutionalist claim is that institutions not only “determine” policy, but 
they also model the strategies of actors involved and mediate in both conflict and 
cooperation relationships. (Closa, 1998) By doing so, institutions structure political 
situations and leave their mark on the actor behaviour. As a consequence and in 
delimitation to the liberal intergovernmentalism, which asserts that the development of 
national preferences is exogenous to the international environment, the institutionalism 
sees the institutional arrangements at the European level as endogenous variables which 
shape both the preferences formation and consequently the actor behaviour in 
negotiations. (Kassim; Dimitrakopoulos, 2004)   
  3If we take into account the deep institutionalisation of the Union, it is not surprising that 
the neoinstitutionalism has become a prominent approach in the study of the European 
integration. (Pollack, 2004) However the impact of institutions differs according to the 
circumstances of the negotiation setting and the temporal dimension.  
Scholars had used the concept of institutions twice as independent or dependent 
variable. In the first case authors tried to explain how institutions determined actors 
behaviour and in the second case the attention was focused on the question, why a 
specific institution was set up and how it developed. During last years numerous 
analysis applying this understanding of the impact of institutions were published, so 
new institutionalism has been used and applied to explain recent evolutions in the 
integration process, following the question whether participation in EU institutions can 
change the identities and preferences of member states, like the convention method 
(Beach 2003; Closa, 2004), but also to analyse long term developments of institutions. 
Regarding the institutionalist approach, the institutional environment is the key 
determinant of actor behaviour and it can be broken down into six elements (see 
Dimitrakopoulos; Kassim, 2004), however, in this article only variables at the European 
level in concrete the institutional arrangements for negotiations on financial 
perspectives will be taken into account. 
A comprehensive study of EU financial negotiations must also consider the rationalistic 
components of actors behaviour in negotiations, in addition to the analysis of the impact 
of the institutional context provided by formal and informal norms and practices. 
(Closa, 1998) On the one side state agents are instrumentally rational, motivated by a 
“logic of consequentiality” (March; Olsen, 1989: 949), which means that actors 
behaviour is driven by a logic of anticipated consequences and prior preferences and on 
the other side actors are goal orientated and choose the negotiation position they believe 
to be the most efficient one to reach their desired objectives, which they want to 
maximize following their domestic preferences.  
In my analysis I will apply an institutionalist approach without choosing between the 
different institutionalism, understanding institutions as independent variables and I am 
claiming that the institutional arrangements surrounding the negotiation process created 
an environment which shaped actor behaviour directly, in this sense the actor behaviour 
would have been different within a different institutional arrangement.  
  4III Character of Negotiations on Financial Perspectives 2007-2013 
Applied the neo institutionalism on the investigation objective, a definition for the 
financial negotiation could be: The negotiation on the financial perspective is an 
institution, or set of institutions, understanding institutions as rules, procedures, norms, 
and common understandings, that constitute its members, structure their interactions, 
and contain rules to mediate between power and interests to influence policy outcomes 
(Caporaso; Keeler, 1995: 49). These rules do determine actor behaviour or policy 
outcomes both precisely but also in a fuzzy way making some actions more likely than 
others. (March; Olsen, 2004) 
As in the previous chapter it has been lined out, institutional arrangements at the 
European level are likely to affect both the preferences formation and in consequence 
the actor behaviour. Financial negotiations are held in a very specific institutional 
setting, where national governments are the principal actors and exercise veto power. 
The following paragraphs try to detect valid independent variables which could explain 
new member states negotiation behaviour.  
•  The composition of the EU budget - The European budget is characterised by a 
form of inertia linked to the sedimentation of common policies put into place 
since the 1950s (Lefebvre, 2005) and by structural changes in the revenue 
composition since the eighties. In this sense we have not only to analyse the 
number of issues but also their historical dimension. On the revenue side the EU 
budget is composed of four resources, the three ‘traditional’ - own resources like 
customs duties, agricultural duties / sugar levies and the VAT resource. The 
fourth resource is based on member state GNP which was introduced only to be 
called upon in case there was a shortfall in revenue from the first three 
resources. But as the budget has grown, this resource has gradually become the 
most relevant revenue, with the consequence that the EU budget has 
progressively depended on direct contributions by member states and with the 
increasing importance of the fourth resource the distributional conflicts among 
member states have also increased.  
On the expenditures side the CAP, the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, 
are the main spending categories. The development of these policies is not only 
result of rational economic decision making, but also result of “…outcome of 
past horse-trading and bargaining between member states, very often to pay 
compensation to countries for expected losses” (House of Lords, 2005: Q7). And 
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accidents. […] The main legacy of the ‘founding’ compromises on agriculture 
and structural funds is that the budget is basically seen as a vehicle for the 
redistribution of money between member states, rather than a tool for fostering 
common goals.” (Gros, Micossi, 2005) Budgetary deals were established after 
the scheme that net beneficiaries received parts of the redistributive payments as 
compensation for their assent of certain policies on the EU level (Carrubba, 
1997) and to a certain extent, the wealthy member states were willing to pay for 
the consent of the net beneficiaries by means of subsidies. Nevertheless, since 
they finance the redistributive programmes alone, while the other member states 
profit from them, it is in the interest of the net-contributors to keep the expenses 
for subsidies at the lowest possible level. (Schneider, 2005) 
Once such deals are done, they are hard to undo, “while it is easy to start new 
budget lines and grow expenditure in them, it is far more difficult to curtail 
expenditure once programmes are established and each policy area acquires its 
own support constituency based on functional and national interests” (Levy, 
2004: 192). The accumulation of national constituencies (France - on the 
Common Agricultural Policy, Spain - on the structural/cohesion funds, Great 
Britain – on rebate) leads to the near grid lock in budgetary decision-making
 
(Ardy, 2004: 135) and the interdependence among sub-fields has as consequence 
that attempts to achieve a move in one sub-field are predestined to fail if they 
were not coordinated with changes in other sub-fields. Furthermore the budget 
structure enhances not only the complexity and the opacity of the financial 
framework but also the maceration of objective criteria for EU financial 
assistance. The social cohesion measures, as the biggest heading in the EU 
budget, and the agriculture heading, the second biggest spending item in the EU 
budget, allocated together close to 90 per cent of the Commission spending 
proposals for 2007 to 2013. While the agriculture chapter was already closed by 
unanimity in 2003 only the structural policy heading was subject to negotiation.  
The new financial perspectives have as main objective to finance the 
enlargement, however and paradoxically, this fact was not subject of discussion 
but the conflicts which dominated the negotiations were the defence of the 
benefits of old member states, which were already conflictive topics during the 
negotiations of Agenda 2000. Without a doubt the Spanish and Italian positions, 
  6and with less effect, those from Greece and Portugal, were determined by the 
reduction of their benefits. Enlargement did not provoke a distributive conflict 
but it emphasised already existent conflicts and it created a situation which 
opened new possibilities to change the established path and to debate again 
about the budget structure, without touching the benefits of the new member 
states. 
Despite enlargement, which of course opened a new cleavage in current 
negotiation, and the negotiation on the Constitution, which offered possibilities 
for a paradigm change, no in-deep reforms were carried out, which indicates the 
resistance of the composition of the Budget to be reformed, as Begg underlined: 
“… the same issues will surface in six years time when the next circle starts”. 
(Begg, 2005a) At the same time established rules, as the GNI based resource, 
suited NMS and new tendencies to give money to growth and jobs were seen 
with scepticism since infrastructure projects were the priority for NMS. In this 
sense enlargement did not change the Budget structure, also because NMS had a 
primary interest in maintaining it.  
•  The determination of the negotiation procedure - After three stable Financial 
Frameworks, the costs of change and the outcome of a possible reform are too 
high and too uncertain so that actors didn’t consider an in-deep reform in the 
procedure despite the increase in participating actors. (see Laffan, 2000; 
Lindner, 2003) Once actors have made an institutional choice and adopted a set 
of rules, they are significantly constrain in their ability to leave the path and 
initiate institutional change and if the decision process is repeated with identical 
actors, the institution setting plays a more prominent role and is under stronger 
pressure than in other policy areas. (Lindner, 2003: 916) In this sense applying 
historical institutionalism we can suspect a high degree of path dependency in 
actors’ behaviour, not only in its interests but also in its strategies. Although 
there is no formal rule setting up a detailed timetable for negotiations new 
member states and the Commission emphasised the importance of reaching an 
agreement as soon as possible, since the time for the preparation of the 
programming of the Structural Funds for the next period was calculated with 10 
months. With the consequence that some actors could establish a negotiation 
strategy with a longer time horizon than others, at the same time the time 
horizon made other actors vulnerable to pressure. The application of article 26 of 
  7the current IIA
3 could have lead to significant financial losses for NMS since 
they were not included as full members in the Financial Framework 2000 – 
2006, furthermore funds, which they were already counting on, still had to be 
formally decided upon. 
•  Cleavages at the Council – this is a further variable which could explain actor 
behaviour, in concrete the formation of alliances. “Coalitions simplify complex 
negotiations by reducing the range of alternative options and by identifying the 
strength and weakness of particular groups of supporters or opponents of a 
proposed settlement.” (Hayes-Renshaw; Wallace, 2004: 251) In long established 
negotiation forums, like in financial negotiations, coalitions become embedded 
within the negotiation cleavages. The most important cleavage which has been 
detected is the conflict between net-receivers and net-contributors to the EU 
budget. Although the left-right and the more versus less integration dimensions 
explain also actor behaviour, the distributive dimension shapes the conflict 
structure in the Council more decisively (Schneider, 2005). Through 
enlargement, the distributive preference heterogeneity within the EU increased, 
not only within the old member states and new member states but also within the 
new member states where the spectrum spans from Poland, with nearly one-third 
of the population employed in agriculture, to Malta, which is not affected by any 
of the existing subsidies schemes.  
•  The absorption limit
4 – this variable was especially important for new member 
states. An absorption limit is set on Structural and Cohesion Funds (including 
the relevant parts of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and 
the European Fund for Fisheries) which should not exceed 4 per cent of a 
member state’s GDP. This fact limited automatically the payments new member 
states could expect since they have, in comparison to the old member states, a 
relative low GDP and consequently a low absorption limit, which is not 
optimum for the developmental needs of them and will slow down convergence. 
(Hudges, et.al., 2003) However, the usefulness of this limit was not discussed 
during negotiation. 
                                                 
3 "Should the two arms of the budgetary authority fail to agree on a new financial perspective, […], the 
ceilings for the last year covered by the existing financial perspective will be adjusted …” Article 26 of 
the Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999. 
4 “46. Total annual receipts in any Member State from structural operations (i.e. including the Cohesion 
Fund) should not exceed 4% of national GDP”, Presidency Conclusions, Berlin European Council, 24–25 
March 1999.  
  8•  Decision rules - Decision rules are a further variable which influenced the 
behaviour of actors during the negotiation process.  
Regarding the fact that decisions on the Financial Framework are felt by 
unanimity voting all actors are formally equal in the weight of their vote, but 
their perceived economic and political strength influence their real voting 
weight. (Beach, 2003) While formal institutional rules do not decisively shape 
the relative power position of actors, they could influence them and have a 
substantial effect on their ability to threaten specific kinds of action. (Farrell; 
Héritier, 2005: 278) In the EU formal voting rules are relevant, but also informal 
rules, such as the consensus culture that characterises EU decision making 
(Elgström; Jönsson, 2000), have decisive importance. Furthermore the existence 
of formal rules provokes the emergence of informal institutions to avoid 
deadlock situations. The possibility of deciding by majority vote has changed 
negotiation strategies and coalitions become necessary and almost inevitable 
(Wallace, 1990: 222-23) but also unanimity voting provokes a tendency to 
coalition building. Whereas classic coalition theory predicts coalitions that are as 
small as possible in majority voting decisions, as states try to build a blocking 
majority, we could assume in unanimity voting decisions the tendency to build 
alliances as big as possible in order to isolate opposing interests. The outcome 
depended on the way in which each country managed to defend its interests, to 
engage in compromise and to build alliances. In council negotiations member 
states coalitions are hard to identify because they are part of the informal 
decision-making process and there is no formal agreement between any given 
states. They are process coalitions rather than voting coalitions in the sense that 
they are formed during the negotiations until consensus is reached. Process 
coalitions are formed during negotiations with the purpose of demonstrating 
combined strength, to put emphasis behind persuasion efforts or to boost morale 
arguments among a group of advocates (Dupont, 1994: 153-55, in Elström, 
2002). As mentioned above, scholars detected various cleavage lines within the 
Council, former budget negotiations did show that net contributors united to 
diminish their share of the funding, whereas the recipients of regional funds 
coalesced to defend their interests – the process coalitions served to clarify 
standpoints and the existing balance of power, in this sense coalition building is 
a more usual phenomenon in situations where interests are clearly opposed 
  9(Elgström, et.al., 2001). If conflicts become more frequent in an enlarged Union, 
we could clearly expect to see much more tendency to coalition behaviour. 
Unanimity voting agreements provoked in the past package deals and issue 
linkages, which could also be seen as ways out of a grid lock in the negotiation 
process. Nevertheless, in recent negotiations there were no great European 
projects that coalitions could veto or bargain for, in order to persuade or to ally 
net payers to raise their contributions. Nevertheless, though financial 
negotiations are seen as one compact negotiation, it is a negotiation about 
different headings and the different issues are linked to each other in “nested 
games”. (Tsebelis, 1990) Negotiation on the financial perspectives differs from 
other negotiation experiences of NMS within or with the EU. Accession 
negotiations could hardly be defined as negotiations. The candidate countries 
had to meet specified obligations before joining the EU which included political 
obligations, economic obligations and institutional obligations. During the 
nineties and at the beginning of the twentieth century the accession countries 
protested against the different treatment to them in comparison to former 
enlargement rounds. However, they did not have negotiation power, to 
materialise their demands in threats. The European Commission discussed with 
the candidates their capacity to fulfil the obligations especially their capacity to 
adopt and implement the EU acquis communautaire. The negotiations took place 
under the principle of the integrity of the acquis and the only possible outcome 
of the negotiations was the full application of it by the NMS, which means in 
other words, a bargaining asymmetry between the EU and the candidates, which 
had no credible capacity to threaten so as to obtain a better agreement. In this 
sense recent financial negotiations were the first negotiation in which NMS 
could threaten to veto the final decision.  
•  Net balances - Negotiations on financial perspectives were carried on within 
working groups or bilateral conversations, the matters under discussion and the 
rules and terms were complex, nevertheless winners and losers could be easily 
detected taken into account the simplifying concentration on net balances. Since 
negotiation focused, from the beginning, on the net balances, we can assume that 
member states were acting well informed about motivations of other states and 
about the consequences of proposals in net balances of each member state, since 
mathematic models could easily detect them. The concentration on net balances 
  10let actors behave with a bazaar mentality, negotiating about relatively small 
amounts of money and losing the vision for the added value of the EU budget 
and in this last negotiation, the financing of enlargement. 
 
 
IV Empirical Findings – member states in financial negotiation - Poland 
Already in spring 2003, we had two important events, which influenced the 
development of budget negotiation. In March Jacques Chirac, alienated the 10 candidate 
states when he told them that they had lost an opportunity to shut up by supporting the 
war in Iraq. Also Germany threatened with financial repercussions for Spain and Poland 
after the collapse of the Council in December in Brussels. Poland and Spain fought on 
this time together to uphold the greater power given to them in voting principles 
contained in the Nice Treaty against the reduced power conferred in the draft 
constitution. Threats that provoked an angry Polish Foreign Affairs Minister 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz to say that the EU could not function based on "carrots and 
sticks"
5. The threat to punish member states with financial consequences raised 
scepticism in many of the countries entering the Union to the German-French axis and 
strengthened the alliance between GB and the new member states and in especial the 
alliance between Poland and Spain. When on 10 of February 2004 the Prodi-
Commission published its proposals on the Financial Perspectives 2007 - 2013,
6 Poland 
agreed with Spain to support the proposals. Also within the Visegrad group Poland 
backed these proposals. Even though the alliance between Poland and Spain was 
attacked by German Finance Minister, Hans Eichel, who voiced an idea to increase 
funds granted to the new EU countries, including Poland, at the cost of the old 
beneficiaries, Poland maintained the liaison with Spain.
7 Nevertheless after 1 May 
2004, Warsaw got closer to London, as both countries shared the pro-Atlantic views, 
were present in Iraq and supported the Anglo-Saxon liberal model. It was also GB that, 
as one of the unique country, opened its labour market to Polish workers, nevertheless 
new member states had already a very strong resentment about the British abatement 
and they were concerned and dismayed when they realized that even before they joined 
the Union in May 2004 they had to pay for the British abatement. (Begg 2005b) 
                                                 
5 EU's richest six urge budget cap, BBC news, 16.12.2003. 
6 COM(2004) 101 final, Building our common Future - Policy challenges and Budgetary means of the 
Enlarged Union 2007-2013. 
7 German Government Offers More Money For Poland, Polish News Bulletin, 12.02.2004.  
  11For the first time in November 2004 Poland considered to shift sides in the negotiations 
leaving the coalition with old beneficiaries and to join forces with the net contributors 
considering that the amount of money which it could gained in the negotiation was 
because of the absorption limit restricted.
8 In the for field of the December Council 
2004 the Polish position met with understanding and support from other new member 
states, including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia.
9 The fracture with Spain 
deepened when Spain insisted on eliminating from the text of the Council declaration a 
provision which gave priority to helping new member states to reach the EU average in 
terms of economic development, which was immediately interpreted by NMS as an 
attempt to reduce structural funds granted to them.  
Finally in January 2005 the Polish government was more convinced about the 
possibility of changing its strategy and joining the “gang of the six” in exchange for a 
guarantee that subsidies for the EU's new member states will be left untouched. "We 
will have no difficulty leaving the Spaniards alone with their problems, if we find out 
that their financial needs are to be satisfied at our cost."
10 The split between Poland and 
Spain over the budget was a gift to the net contributors, which wanted to drive a wedge 
between old and new net recipients.  
In March 2005, Poland showed first apprehension that the financial perspectives could 
not be reached by 2005 and agreed to a reduction of the next EU budget for 2007-2013 
if the final agreement on this issue was obtained by June.
11 However, Poland did not 
accept cuts in EU structural aid as proposed under the compromise prepared by 
Luxembourg.
12 Luxembourg had proposed to leave the limit of 4 per cent of national 
GDP only for states whose gross national domestic product was lower than 40 per cent 
of the EU average, only two countries would have had qualified for this group: Bulgaria 
and Romania. Poland would have been entitled to receive aid in the amount of 3.8 per 
cent of GNP. "This proposal is unacceptable. We don't see any reason why the threshold 
of 4 per cent of GNP […] stipulated in the Accession Treaty should be reduced," said 
Jaroslaw Pietras, Minister for European Affairs.
13 According to Polish estimates, the 
                                                 
8 Poland may switch sides in EU budget battle, Reuters News, 15:58, 08.11.2004,  
9 Poland Forms Alliance to Fight for Better EU Budget, Polish News Bulletin, 09.12.2004. 
10 ibid. 
11 Poland Ready For Compromise On EU Budget, Polish News Bulletin, 14.03.2005. 
12 European Council, Negotiating box on the Financial Perspectives, Doc. N° 9065/05, CADREFIN 108.  
13 Poland Says No to Luxemburg's Proposals Regarding EU Budget, Polish News Bulletin, 25.04.2005. 
  12decrease of the absorption limit from 4.0 to 3.8 per cent of Poland's GDP would have 
meant the loss of 2.8 bn euro within the seven-year budget plan.
14
In the forefield of the June Council, Poland took part in the 'friends of cohesion' meeting 
in Portugal, whose final agreement called for an end to the British rebate. Also the 
Weimar Triangle, in which France and Germany tried to recover their ally Poland since 
2004, and the Visegrad Group adopted a common position against the rebate and 
demanded the reconsideration of the British rebate, latter agreed also a common 
position to focus on increasing the share of regional aid.  
During negotiation, Poland became progressively entangled in the Anglo-French battle 
over reform of the 2007-2013 budget. While France used the disappointment of the 
NMS about the position obtained by Blair and demanded that, since Britain strongly 
supported EU enlargement to spread democracy, it was unacceptable that Britain did not 
pay its share of the costs.
15 The British government planned to regain the moral high 
ground  by cancelling the contributions that the Eastern European countries made to its 
rebate in order to improve their net balances. These moral arguments provoked certain 
optimism in the fore field of the June Council, however, Poland was keen to stand aside 
the British-French discussion at the summit and concentrated on receiving the 
maximum of EU money as the absorption limit allowed. Although the Luxembourg 
presidency budget proposal, launched on the 15 June,
16 was lowering the cap on 
Structural and Cohesion Fund transfers to regions to 3.9 per cent of GDP from 4 per 
cent, Polish foreign minister said:  "I have the impression that if it depended on Poland 
we would find a resolution, […] The Luxembourg position may be acceptable to all 
[and the] change we see as our sacrifice for a compromise."
17
However, no agreement was reached due to the strong British opposition to the reform 
of its rebate, even though Poland, the Czech Republic and other new member states 
proposed a last reshuffle of funds that would have seen a portion of their development 
aid shifted over to Britain and the Netherlands to secure an EU budget agreement.  
At the end of June, Blair was seriously concerned since the collapse of the deal had 
disappointed the east European states his desperately needed allies in the ongoing 
British presidency. To regain the partnership, GB launched an offensive in the last week 
                                                 
14 Polish Press Agency (PAP), 13.06.2005. 
15 Poor countries wooed by offer on contributions;EU, The Times, 15.06.2005. 
16 European Council, Negotiating box on the Financial Perspectives, Doc. N° 10090/05, CADREFIN 
130.  
17 Warsaw aims to steer clear of Anglo-French rift, Financial Times, 16.06.2005.  
  13of June to counterbalance relations with Poland and other new member states. John 
Prescott, deputy prime minister, and Douglas Alexander, minister for Europe,  made 
separate trips to Poland, Lithuania and other east European states to explain why Britain 
vetoed a budget deal.
18 However, the same  week, the French European affairs minister, 
Catherine Colonna, visited Hungary and participated together with her German 
counterpart at the "Weimar Triangle'' summit in Poland. 
The attention paid to the new member states, especially to Poland, was seen by the 
Polish political elite as an opportunity to assume a leading role in the EU. "We have a 
rare chance of playing a creative role as one of the driving forces for integration at a 
time when Europe is dominated by apathy."
19 Nevertheless, Poland maintained its 
strategy to steer a course between Britain and the continental powers and concentrated 
its efforts to increase the amounts, which could be received in structural aid. 
On 1 of July, GB assumed the presidency with an optimistic working programme and 
from Estonia and Poland to Hungary member states cautiously embraced Blair's vision 
of a modern bloc financed by a modern budget designed to meet new challenges, 
acording to Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rotfeld: "I really like this [Blair] vision 
because Europe today needs to take a fresh look at itself and to adapt better to the 
challenges of the contemporary world."
20 However, Poland warned the British EU 
presidency not to try to link an agreement on the EU budget for 2007-2013 to budgetary 
reform. Hungary, which assumed the presidency of the Visegrad group at the same 
time, withdrew that further EU budget talks could not use the offer made by new 
members at the June Council to forego some of their funding as starting point. But also 
disputes between the Visegrad group, where on the one hand Poland and Hungary made 
clear that maintaining farming subsidies was crucial for them and on the other hand 
Slovakia supported a reform in order to raise funds for research and development, were 
latent. However, the group understood the possibility to demonstrate leadership and 
submitted several proposals so as to bring forward the negotiations and to give 
preference to an early agreement before financial reforms.
21 In this sense NMS reacted 
furiously when the UK confirmed that the EU summit in autumn, aimed at reaching an 
agreement on the next EU budget, would be cancelled. As a reaction to it, the Visegrad 
                                                 
18 Charm offensive aims to woo east European states on budget, Financial Times, 24.06.2005.  
19 London, Paris and Berlin come to seek Polish support in EU budget debate, Financial Times, 
28.06.2005. 
20 Across Europe, Blair's vision of a changed EU gains support, International Herald Tribune, 24.06.2005. 
21 Poles, Czechs seek quick EU budget compromise, Reuters News, 21.07.2005. 
  14group undertook efforts to increase its pressing power, through the incorporation of 
communitarian institution or other member states. The Visegrad group, defended its 
common position also at Council meetings like on the informal European Council 
meeting in Hampton Court on October 27, where Hungary's Prime Minister Ferenc 
Gyurcsány represented the common view that it was unacceptable that the EU budget 
should be shrinking when EU membership and EU priorities were increasing.
22  
After the legislative elections in Poland on 25 September, the new government 
reaffirmed the priority of the outgoing administration and although Kazimierz 
Marcinkiewicz, the new prime minister, made his first foreign trip after elections to 
London,  the Polish opposition to the presidency proposals were growing, in this sense 
the Polish Prime Minister said the visit was "not an anchor for all eternity. It was a 
logical visit but it is not the case that we will stick only with the British position. […] 
As a principle we should not tie ourselves to a single partner, even if the partner in this 
case controls the presidency of the European Union".
23 The proposal of the Presidency 
to cut structural aid of almost 10 per cent in funding for eastern Europe, which was 
published on 5 December, was immediately subject of enormous critics not only from 
new member states. Finally the “famous” mail sent by the British ambassador in Poland, 
Crawford, in which he defamed Poland for blocking Blair's attempts to secure an EU 
budget deal, deepened the critical situation of the Polish British alliance.
24 Although 
Blair started a shuttle diplomacy in the first December week to the new member states 
to try to come up with a deal on the financial perspectives at the EU summit on 15-16 
December has seen him facing tough criticism. The word "unacceptable" has been 
ringing out at the beginning of December from the Baltics to Warsaw to Budapest after 
the UK launched the idea of cutting back the structural fund payments. At the beginning 
of December the UK softened its previous stand on its budget rebate and excluded the 
new member states from shouldering their part of the UK rebate. Thus, the UK hoped to 
avoid losing its allies in the new member states, and avoid the accusation that it did not  
want to pay for the enlargement, stating that “the people who benefit most from that 
[British] deal are the accession countries, both in terms of the certainty and the ability to 
get their money."
25
                                                 
22 Blair to seek east Europe's support on EU budget, Reuters News, 18.11.2005. 
23 Friction with UK causes Warsaw to seek allies elsewhere, Financial Times, 13.12.2005.  
24 British ambassador blasts France, Poland in 'joke' email, Agence France Presse, 10.12.2005.  
25 UK seeks cuts to future EU budget, BBC News, 28.11.2005. 
  15As a consequence of the continuing critics by the new member states, the Presidency on 
14 December restored also some cut aid to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia and Latvia, and offered extra money to Slovakia and Lithuania for the 
decomission of their nuclear plants.
26 The British Presidency suggested also additional 
“sweeteners” for Poland like 1 bn EUR to take account of the zloty exchange rate over 
2007-2013 and 206 mil EUR for the five Polish regions where GDP per inhabitant is the 
lowest in the EU25
27. However, the margin between the British offer and the possible 
amount of money within the 4 per cent of national GDP limit was still too huge and 
Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz said: "This proposal, if it remains 
unchanged, will be vetoed by Poland."
 28  
Nevertheless and even though Poland's prime minister and President appealed to the 
NMS to stick together and fight for changes to the draft, the coalition between NMS 
began to erode and after the Conclave between the foreign ministers of Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Estonia, they changed their initial view of UK plans from 
"unacceptable" to "we are ready to negotiate"
29. The Central and Eastern European 
countries were in a dilemma on the eve of the European Council on 15/16 December, 
since they announced back in June that they were prepared, to a certain extent, to give 
up some part of the funding to which they were entitled, in return of an agreement. 
Furthermore, the most important thing for them was an agreement, which would have 
allowed them to receive the support marked for the start of 2007.  
A few hours before the start of the European Council, France and Poland joined forces 
to reject the latest British proposal. The foreign ministers of France and Poland wrote on 
14 December in the FT that the British proposal makes "victims" of poor member states 
and that it "cannot become the basis of an agreement"
30, while France wanted the UK to 
cutback its rebate even further, Poland wanted spending levels to be revised back to the 
levels proposed by Luxembourg in June.  
On 16 December Poland put forward an own proposal close to 1.05 per cent of GNI in 
accordance with Berlin, Paris, the Visegrad Group and the Baltic states.
31  
                                                 
26 European Council, Financial Perspective 2007-2013, Doc. N° 15649/05, CADREFIN 264 
€ 375 million for V-1 Jaslovske Bohunice in Slovakia,€ 865 million for Ignalina in Lithuania 
27 Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Warmínsko-Mazurskie, Podlaskie and Świętokrzyskie 
28 UK's new budget plan not enough to get European Council to reach agreement 15.12.2005.  
29 Anglo-French tensions reignited in EU budget spat, Financial Times, 07.12.2005. 
30 France and Poland unite against UK budget plan, Financial Times, 14.12.2005. 
31 Belgium: Poland presents increased EU budget proposal to Britain, BBC Monitoring European, 
16.12.2005.  
  16Finally the demise of the Franco-German axis changed the whole chemistry of the 
summit and Chancellor Merkel was bringing Blair and Chirac together on the question 
of the British rebate, and the terms of a review on future EU spending in 2008-09 and 
after she said she could accept the overall budget rising to 1.045 per cent of GNI the 
way for an agreement was paved. Britain agreed to cut its rebate during the seven years 
period and agreed to raise the overall ceiling following the German proposal. Although 
Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Ireland accepted this compromise, Poland 
and Hungary were still demanding more and it took a further offer from Berlin, 75 mil 
EUR originally designated for East Germany and 25 mil EUR for Bavaria, to close the 
deal.
32  
Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz and several other leaders paid tribute 
to Chancellor Angela Merkel for having helped broker the deal and offering extra cash 
at the last minute to meet the new member states' demands.  "Merkel at the last minute 
gave 100 million euros extra for Poland which was the most beautiful and wonderful 
gesture of solidarity,"
33 said Marcinkiewicz.  
Of the overall 862.3 bn EUR EU budget for 2007-2013, 91 bn EUR will go to Poland, 
making it the single largest beneficiary of EU aid. Poland will receive close to 60 bn 
EUR in structural aid, a fifth of the community's total structural aid spending.
34  
 
                                                 
32 Early morning deal ends year of horsetrading by ministers, Financial Times, 19.12.2005. 
33 EU leaders agree long-term budget deal, Reuters News, 17.12.2005. 
34 European Council, Financial Perspective 2007-2013, Doc. N° 15915/05, CADREFIN 268. 
  17V Conclusions  
Returning to my preliminary hypothesis we can affirm that in spite of the new cleavage 
in the negotiation, new net beneficiaries vs. old beneficiaries, and despite the new power 
relations, enlargement did not provoke a fundamental change of negotiation procedures 
or influenced the general budget structure, nevertheless it increased the complexity of it, 
we are counting in the new financial perspectives 18 additional provisions with a 
financial volume of more than 10 bn EUR.  
Analysing the negotiation behaviour of Poland in the given institutional arrangements 
we could affirm that the behaviour of this actor would have been distinct in a different 
environment. I detected several institutional variables at the European level which 
determined actor’s behaviour during the negotiation. As we have seen, the institutional 
environment shaped the behaviour of Poland during financial negotiation. Governments 
do not necessarily enter EU negotiations with fixed strategies for negotiation behaviour, 
the strategies are subject to a development and evolve in reaction to discussions and 
proposals at the negotiating table within the institutional setting. First of all we could 
see that the decision rule of unanimity forced member states to search for alliances in 
order to increase their negotiation potential. However, long-term, stable coalitions seem 
to have been replaced by ad-hoc coalitions with process character which emerge on a 
case by case basis. The Polish government has made several efforts to form alliances, 
first with Spain, then with the net contributors but also with the friends of cohesion, 
later it concentrated on the Visegrad Group and on the wider group of all new EU 
members and finally Poland focused on the Weimar triangle. But also Poland as the 
biggest new member state was seen as an important ally by other member states in order 
to improve their negotiation potential. The changes of Poland from punctual relations 
with Spain, over its former natural ally GB and to France were important events in the 
development of the negotiation and showed the new dynamic of partnerships in the 
enlarged union. Also Cyprus, was expected to back the UK and the ‘one per cent club’ 
since this NMS was already a net contributor. However, differences regarding the 
‘Cyprus question’ pushed Cyprus towards France, an ally on that question, but with 
markedly different economic interests. 
Secondly the absorption ceiling of 4 per cent of national GDP and the budget structure 
determined decisively the negotiation behaviour of Poland. The interests of new 
member states to join the Union were various and they were not just reluctant to receive 
  18regional aid. However, the cohesion and structural funds are an important element for 
the future regional development of NMS and were expected by them. Warsaw was 
mindful of the enormous benefits gained by other countries included in earlier 
enlargements such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain and was worried about the 
fact that similar generosity may not be on offer to the former communist states.
35 Since 
the CAP spending until 2013 was already agreed and the amount of structural funds 
were limited by 4 per cent of national GDP, the negotiation margin was very tight and 
Poland concentrated on fulfilling this margin.  
Furthermore the dependency on an agreement at the end of 2005 or at the beginning of 
2006 determined the negotiation behaviour of new member states and shaped their 
behaviour. So the alliance among all NMS broke on this theme since some of them 
preferred an early agreement to financial losses in the first months of the new financial 
period.  
During negotiations the new member states, especially the Visegrad group were not an 
obstacle but, on the contrary, contributed actively in the search of a compromise and 
became shortly at the end of the Council, according to Juncker, the “spirit” of the 
twenty-five, due to their vital interest on the future of the Union. Also after the Council 
they showed more pragmatism than other states, when Chirac Schröder and Blair 
accused those who, in their opinion, provoked the failure. Following this strategy 
Poland offered to the Foreign Affairs Ministers a meeting to work together in order to 
reach an agreement which could solve this crisis.  
At the end I will return to the question if new member states really “arrived” and 
participate as equal actors in the Union. During the last decade central and east 
European countries passed a remarkable transformation in the perception of their west 
European allies. At the beginning of the nineties these countries were seen by its 
European neighbours as heroes who shook of communist dictatorship and at the same 
time as grateful markets for west European products, later as political powder keg since 
accession negotiations were not specially welcomed in old member states and 
furthermore as American Trojan Horses, due to their role in the Iraq crisis. However, in 
recent financial negotiations NMS were seen as allies and serious rivals concerning  
structural funds and they negotiated as equal partners in the Union. In words of Polish 
Foreign Minster Stefan Meller: "The situation in the EU has changed, we have 
                                                 
35 Poles hit out at 'national egoism', Financial Times, 19.12.2005. 
  19undergone an evolution since we joined the bloc 18 months ago and our priorities from 
the beginning are now seen in a different light."
36 And Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz 
Marcinkiewicz told Poland's lower house of parliament on 29 December: "Poland is 
currently at the heart of Europe and we have stopped being a new member country, we 




                                                 
36 EU budget summit marks policy shift for Poland, Reuters News, 16.12.2005. 
37 Poland's success in EU budget negotiations reveal it as pillar of EU, PM says, Interfax Poland Weekly 
Business Report, 30.12.2005. 
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